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Abstract 
In this paper, we show that if capital and labour are cOllzplementmy inputs and labour 
is in surplus[LS}, economic development will reduce investment in the agricultural sector. 
We analyse the impact of factor substitutability and factor mobility on economic welfare 
as indicated by changes in output by the use of appropriate fisca l policies in LS economies. 
Next, we demonstrate how a LS economy results in a higher agricultural employment but 
it can also accumulate more capital in the rural sector under certain conditions given by 
the elasticity of subs til uti on between inputs in a nested CES production function. Finally, 
we analyse the we1:fare economics of m igration and show that the net benefits crucially 
depend on the response of urban unemployment rate to migration and the flexibility of real 
wages with respect to unemployment rate. Migration without capital mobility is we1:fare 
enhancing iff the absolute value of the semi-elasticity of the urban real wage with respect to 
industrial unemployment is large. Benefits from migration are then estimated by calibrating 
the model. In the long-run, we allow capital to adjust to the increases in migration to show 
the welfare-enhancing impact of migration. 
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1. Introduction 
The theoretical foundations of very few formal models that exist to explain in-
vestment in backward regions, say, agriculture, in 'labour-surplus' (LS) economies 
of less developed countries (LDCs) in many parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe(see,e.g. Dixit,1968; Stern,1972; Neher, 1966) are weak. It 
is assumed that since real wages, usually institutionally given, are in excess of its 
marginal productivity in the backward areas, the private return to capital would be 
below its marginal social product; hence investment falls . As the wage level is above 
the Pareto optimum, labour employment in industry is sub-optimal relative to the 
use of capital. Growth in industrial capital accumulation is regarded as essential 
for using 'surplus' labour in LDCs. Since the MPL in poor regions is very low, it 
is impossible to maintain full employment at any positive wage rate (Dixit,1968). 
Dixit, along with Lewis (1954), assumes a perfectly elastic supply of labour from 
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the backward sector at an institutionally given wage. Stern (1972) relaxes this as-
sumption and calculates the optimal capital accumulation path and the shadow 
wage rate. However, few try to analyse the impact of investment and migration 
in a LS economy, particularly when inputs for production could be substitutes or 
complements and the MPL in backward region is less than the real wage. Nor do 
they explain the co-existence of surplus labour and rising stock of capital in LDCs 
-an empirical phenomenon that intrigued Marx, Schultz (1964), and Thomas 
(1982). The main motivation of this paper is to show that if capital and labour 
are complementary inputs and labour is in surplus, economic development will 
reduce investment in the agricultural sector. Here, we analyse the impact of factor 
substitutability and factor mobility on economic welfare as indicated by changes in 
output by the use of appropriate fiscal policies in LS economies. In section II, we 
determine real product wage and the unemployment rate in the urban sector with 
given capital cost and the terms of trade between the agriculltural and industrial 
sector. In equilibrium, the marginal product is less than rural wage and the solution 
is Pareto-inefficient. We also determine rural employment and capital formation 
given rural prices, wages and the price of capital. In section III, we demonstrate how 
a LS economy results in a higher agricultural employment. We also show that a LS 
economy can accumulate more capital in the rural sector under certain conditions 
given by the elasticity of substitution between inputs in a nested CES production 
function . In section IV, we analyse the welfare economics of migration and show 
that the net benefits crucially depend on the response of urban unemployment rate 
to migration and the flexibil ity of real wages with respect to unemployment rate. 
Migration without capital mobility is welfare enhancing iff the absolute value of 
the semi-elasticity of the urban real wage with respect to industrial unemployment 
is large. Benefits from migration are then estimated by calibrating the model. In 
the long-run, we allow capital to adjust to the increases in migration to show the 
welfare-enhancing impact of migration. The final section draws conclusions. 
2. The Model 
Consider a two-sector economy, industry and agriculture. Each sector employs 
labour and capital Ki, L i, i :co: f ,A corresponding to the two sectors and, in addi-
tion, agriculture employs a fixed amount of land, R . Production in each sector is 
characterised by a constant returns to scale production function. Both labour and 
capital are free to move between the two sectors. Output markets are competitive 
but in the labour market, unemployment exists and the pool of unemployment 
forms part of the urban workforce N[:2: Lr. The details are as follows. 
2.1 The Industrial Sector 
The representative industrial firm maximises profits 
ill =PrY [-W[Lr-rKPrK[ (2.1) 
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with respect to L I, and K;, where PI is the price of output, fVj the wage, rK the cost 
of capital and YI is output given by the homogeneous production function 
Y/=F(L / ,KI)=LI!(K / I L,);FLf ,F Kf , FLfK1>O ; FLfLI,FKf ,K}<O (2.2) 
The capital good consists of output from the industrial sector. In carrying out 
this optimisation, PI, Wr and rK are parametric to the firm. The first order condi· 
tions are 
(2.3) 
and 
(2.4) 
where kJ = KdLI is the capital-labour ratio. Equation (2.3) holds in the short run 
when capital is fixed. Since FI41 < 0 we have the familiar diminishing marginal 
product of labour curve and labour demand is a diminishing function of LI. In the 
long run both (2.3) and (2.4) hold. Hence given the cost of capital rK, (2,4) deter-
mines the capital-labour ratio kl. Then given kl, (2.3) determines the real product 
wage WdPI . The second order conditions for a maximum are 
(2.5) 
To determine employment and unemployment in the industrial sector we require 
a 'wage equation' which determines the nominal wage given the price level. A for-
mulation which is consistent with both a bargaining and efficiency wage theory 3 is 
where Pc is the consumer price index and 
U _!jl- L I 1 -
NI 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
is the urban unemployment rate. Let PA be the price of agricultural output and 
e the fixed share of industrial output in the urban workers' consumption basket. 
Then we put 
(2.8) 
and the real product wage is then given by 
WI =(f!!.. Y -Oh(U r) 
PI PI/ 
(2.9) 
See, for example Layard et al (1991), chapter 2. 
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Given the cost of capital rK and the terms of trade between the agricultural and 
urban sectors PA/P], (2.3), (2.4) and (2.9) determine the real product wage and the 
unemployment rate in the urban sector. Then given the size of the urban workforce 
N[, (2.7) determines urban employment in the long run. 
2.2 The Backward Sec~or 
The idea of a labour surplus in a backward economy is formalised by assum-
ing that the EAU firm maximises a utility function consisting of profits plus the 
monetary value associated with achieving a high employment target . Thus the 
farm-owner maximises a utility 
(2.10) 
with respect to LA and /(1, where agricultural output YA is given by a constant 
returns to scale production function 
Y A = G(LA,KA,R) ;GLA,G}(A,GR > 0 GLALA, G }(AKAGRR < 0; 
(2.11) 
rR is the rental cost of land and L A;::: L A is the target level of employment. Other 
variables are defined ~ before. The last term in (2.11) is a quadratic welfare loss 
associated with L A < LA. The first order conditions for an internal solution are 
OY A ';' P A-
a
-=WA-2a(LA - L A)= O 
LA 
and in macroeconomic equilibrium land rent is given by 
aYA 
P A oR =rR 
Second order conditions are 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
Thus in (2.12) the marginal product of labour is less than the EAU wage. 
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) determine rural employment and capital stock given 
PA, JiVA, and rl(. To complete the model we need two relationships to determine WA 
and the urban workforce. (rl(, prices PA and PI we recall are exogenous) . These are 
provided by the equations in the following section 2.3. 
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2.3 The Migration Equilibrium and Resource Constraint 
In a Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium the rural wage is equated with the 
expected urban wage minus the real costs of migration C (in terms of un it.s of 
industrial output). Urban workers are chosen at random so that the probability of 
employment in the urban sector is given by 
LJ p=-=l - U J 
NJ 
Thus the no migration equilibrium condition is given by 
PJWJ+(l- PJ)Wu - PIC = W A 
where w,. is the income of the urban unemployed. The resource constraint 
NT + LA == N 
where N is the total lPopulation, completes the model. 
3. The Implications of a I_abour Surplus [or Rural Investment 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
From (2.16) and (2.17) the rural wage W A is determined by the unemployment 
rate in the urban secltor and the urban wage. Given PI, both are determined in the 
urban sector and are given to the rural sector. We may therefore differentiate 
(2.12) to give 
( dLA dKA) 2(- ' ) 2 dLA PA G1 L --+GL K' - - = LA - LA + a--
. A A da A A da da 
(3 .1) 
and differentiating (2.14) 
(3.2) 
Hence solving we arrive at 
dLA - 2(LA - LA)GKA K A 
= ---- ------- - ----
da 
which from (2.15) is positive. Hence 
Proposition 1 
A labour surplus economy results in higher agricultural employment. 
All this is obvious. Of more substance is the following proposition which follows 
from proposition 1 and (3.3). 
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Proposition 2 
A labour surplus economy results in a higher level of capital stock in the rural 
sector if GLAKA >0. 
To provide more insight into proposition 2 consider the following nested CES 
production function 
(3.4) 
where 
M=(w2K-Q2+(1 wz)L-Q2r ll Q,; Ih*O 
= K W'L 1-w2 (12 = 0 
(3.5) 
In (3.4) and (3.6) we have dropped the subscript A since we are now focusing 
exclusively on the rural sector. The elasticity of substitution between land and other 
factor inputs is given by 01 = 1/(1 + Pl) and 02 = 11(1 +(2) is the labour-capital elastic-
ity. - 1 < Qi < infinity; i == 1,2 and Qi < 0 applies if factors are good substitutes. 
Partially differentiating (3.4) twice we have 
oG 0 ['OG OM] 
G LK = G KL. == oK oL == oK . oM oL 
o2G oM oM oG o2M 
= ---.- - - + - ----
oM2 oK oL oM oK oL 
(3 .6) 
Rewriting (3.4) and (3.5) as 
(3.7) 
for Qi * 0, i = 1,2 we then have 
oG _ n - lIQ ,-lM - Q - 1 
--WI01 ' 
oM 
(3.8) 
(3 .9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
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Hence combining (3.7) to (3.11) the condition GLK> 0 becomes 
1- WIM-QI/81 «1+Q2)/(1+Ql) (3.12) 
The left-hand-side of (3.12) is less than unity and has a straightforward economic 
interpretation. From the first-order condition (2.13) we have 
r Kl~ = £1- wlLR-el = 1- wlM-el 
PAG 81 81 
(3.13) 
Hence the following corollary to proposition 2: 
Corollary 
For the nested CES production function (3.4) and (3.5) a labour surplus economy 
results in a higher level of capital stock iff 
rRR 1+ Q7 
- _.<-_':. 
Y A l+Ql (3.14) 
The left-hand-side of (3.14) is the land rent's share of agricultural income. For 
Cobb-Douglas technology Ql =Q2=0 and condition (3.14) is always satisfied. But a 
combination of land and capital being good substitutes (Q2 < 0) and land and other 
factors being poor substitutes (Ql >0) can result in (3.14) breaking down. Then the 
labour surplus effect captured by introducing a parameter a >0 in the farm-owner's 
utility function (2.10) can result in a lower level of capital stock in agriculture. 
Empirically, it has been observed that land and capital are good substitutes in 
relatively land-abundant countries. They are poor substitutes in many other LDCs 
either because of an adverse man-land ratio or because of the very small size-hold-
ing of land witnessed in large parts of the Indian sub-continent and China. If it is 
relatively easy to substitute capital for land, the factor whose price has increased 
will be substituted for the cheaper one. Schultz (1964) argued that traditional agri· 
culture does in fact employ substantial amount of capital. Note that the tendency to 
over - or - under-invest in agriculture will depend on the source of savings. Where 
landlords are main potential sources of such savings (see. e.g., Fei and Ranis, 
1964 for empirical evidence) , an increase in capital accumulation in developing 
agriculture is to be expected, particularly with a rise in the landlord's share in total 
income. Under such circumstances, the empirical validation of equation (3.14) 
is not difficult to understand. Thomas (1983) reports that in some rural areas of 
Turkey, agricultural equipment is 'plentiful': ' the intensive mechanisation of certain 
agricultural regions has had the effect of.. .increasing rural unemployment and at 
the sane time the numbers of people drifting to the towns.' Hence, the introduc-
tion of new techniques and capital accumulation becomes ineffective in improving 
material benefits in a traditional LS economy. Such a phenomenon provides an 
explanation for more capital accumul ation and industrialisation at the expense of 
labour absorption in a LS economy(Norton and Alwang,1993) .Moreover, when 
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the small enterprises of an industrial society are surrounded by backward technol-
ogy in a LDC, the modern sector tends to accumulate more capital - regardless 
of its quality- despite the presence of surplus labour. (Higgins,1956; Myint,1964; 
Maciewski, et.a!. on Poland,1995) . 
Whether capital and land are good (or poor) substitutes (P2 < 0) and land and 
other factors are poor substitutes (PI, >0) a.re really empirical issues which warrant 
country- specific studies. A priori, African countries like Nigeria and Kenya, Uganda 
are examples where P2 <0 and P I > 0 (because of poor availability of proper HYV 
seeds and organic fertilisers) which have also experienced a lower level of capital 
stock in agriculture (Lele,U,1992; World Bank,1992). 
4. The Welfare Economics of Migration 
Consider a migration equilibrium with employment in the two sectors given 
by LA =LA and L/=L/. We now pose the question as to whether this equilibrium 
implies that the urban workforce is too big or too small. To answer the question 
consider a further migration of MiA workers from the rural to the urban sector 
where M is the migration rate . The urban workforce then grows to N/=NI+MLA 
but many of these will become unemployed. The rural workforce which is fully 
employed falls to LA =LA-ML A . 
4.1 Short-run Analysis 
First consider the short run with capital in both sectors fixed. We choose a 
straightforward measure of social welfare equal to total output minus migration 
costs. It depends on the migration rate (relative to our initial migration equilib-
rium) and is given by 
(4.1) 
in units of industrial output where q =PA/PJ is the relative price of agricultural 
output. 
The urban sector is then too large if dSldM <0 measured at the migration equi-
librium. To investigate this condition differentiate (4.1) and use dLAldM=-LA to 
obtain 
(4.2) 
The first term on the RHS of (4.2) are the possible benefits of further incre-
mental migration arising from higher industrial output. The only exist if SOIne of 
the i.ncrease in the urban workforce results in higher urban output. This will only 
occur if there is some real wage flexibility i.e. , It' < 0 in (2.6). The second term are 
the costs consisting of the drop in rural output (in units of industrial output) and 
migration costs. 
From (2.12) we can write the marginal product of labour (MPL) in the rural 
sector as 
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say, where O<,u<l captures the labour surplus effect driving the MPL below the 
rural wage. 
Denote the real wage in the two sector both in terms of units of industrial 
output by w,== W,IPr and WA == WAIPj and express migration costs as a proportion 
of the rural i.e., P,C==<pWA. Then introducing the first order conditions (2.3) and 
(4.3) into (4.2) gives the condition for more migration to be welfare-enhancing in 
the short run as 
(4.4) 
Whether (4.4) holds or not depends critically on dLtldM, the response of urban 
employment to further migration. 
At the intersection of the real wage equation given by (2.9) and the demand 
for labour curve (2.3) we have: 
1-8h( )_Oy, q U,--
OLI 
(4.5) 
where the unemployment rate VI is defined by (2.7). Differentiating (4.5) gives 
HJh,(U )( __ 1_ dLI +.!::.!... - ) = a2y I. dL, (4.6) 
q 'N,dM NyLA ad dM 
Hence at the migration equilibrium we have 
dL] ql-8h'LAL, 
dM N,CN[F LL ,+ql- lJh') (4.7) using (2.2). 
At this stage it is useful to specialise the production function (2.2). As for the 
backward sector we assume a CES function of the form 
(4.8) 
say. Then differentiating 
~~; = (1-w)L7Q- 1e - (1+1I)Q =w, (4.8) 
using the first order condition (2.3) and 
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, a2YI ()WJ( L/ WI F LILI=--aL2-==--I+ Q -I 1--(1 w)---)=-(I+Q)-sK (4.9) 
I _1 Eli L1 
where SK is capital's share of output. 
Now define T] to be the semi-elasticity of the real product wage WI with respect 
to the unemployment rate liJ. Then from (2.9) we have 
1 l-eh'(UI) 
ry= =q ----
Wi dU1 WI 
(4.10) 
where we recall that q=PAJh Substituting (4.9) and (4.10) into (4.7) and substi-
tuting the resulting expression for dLI/dM into (4.4) gives the condition for more 
migration to be welfare-enhancing as 
wilJLJ 
---2----------=- > (1 11 + <p)w A 
(-N 1(1 + Q)SK +r) NIL I (4.11) 
Putting LJlNI= 1-UI a little algebra then gives the following proposition: 
Proposition 3 
Consider a Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium with rural and urban real wages 
given by W A and W A respectively in terms of units of industrial output. Let UI be the 
urban unemployment rate at this equilibrium. Then a further rural to urban migra-
tion without an adjustment of capital is welfare-enhancing iff the absolute value of 
the semi-elasticity of the urban real wage with respect to UI, "~, is sufficiently large. 
In particular the condition is 
iryi> (l-~+<p)wA(l+Q)sK 
w I(1-UI) wA(1-/H<P)(1-U[) (4.12) 
If (4.12) is not satisfied then a migration the other way from the urban to the 
rural sectors will be increase welfare and there exists 'urban bias' in the migration 
equilibrium. From (4.12) we can see that factors which may lead to insufficient 
migration are: a high labour surplus effect fl; a low rural/urban wage ratio; a low 
cost of migration captured by <P; a low urban unemployment ratio UI and a Q<O 
which implies that the new migrants can substitute for capital. All this is in accord-
ance with economic intuition. 
The importance of real wage flexibility for migration is illustrated in figures 1 
and 2. Assume for the moment that in an initial migration equilibrium the size of the 
workforce in the urban and rural sectors is equal (OA in the figures). Suppose that a 
number BA leave agriculture and migrate to the cities increasing the urban workforce 
by AC=BA. With some real wage ±1exibilitythe BRW curve shifts to BRW' and urban 
employment increases by AD<AC increasing unemployment by DC in that sector. 
The welfare implications of migration can be assessed by comparing the increase 
in urban output, area ADHG, with the drop in rural output, area BAFE (both in 
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terms of units of industrial output). Starting from this initial migration equilibrium 
rural to urban migration by an increment BA is welfare enhancing if ADHG > 
BAFE + costs of migration. If this is not satisfied there is 'urban bias' and some 
reverse migration back to agriculture is welfare-enhancing. 
The two figures compare the case of a relatively high degree of responsiveness 
of the urban real wage to unemployment (see figure 1) with a very low degree of 
responsiveness (see figure 2). In the latter case (which is close to that of a fixed 
real wage as in HT) area ADHG < area BAFE and urban bias exists. 
How likely is condition (4.12) to be satisfied? A problem with the condition is 
that it is expressed in terms of the cost of migration C which is difficult to measure. 
However given data for the urban/rural wage ratio, the urban unemployment rate 
and a guesstimate of the formal/informal urban wage ratio, the cost of migration 
can be deduced from HT migration equilibrium condition (2.10). To proceed along 
these lines, first express the alternative disposable wage w" as a proportions of the 
urban wage. i.e. , put Wu=~Wl. 
Then from the HT migration equilibrium condition (2.17) we have that 
cp = ~ [1 -- U [(1-~)] - 1 (4.13) 
W A 
and the cost of migration is revealed by observable data. 
We now calibrate the model with different sets of parameter values. The results 
are reported in Tables A and B. Note that Table A exaggerates the costs of migra-
tion because it uses the HT selection process. In table A, high migration costs are 
associated with high real wage elasticities. If migration costs are assumed to be zero 
(see Table B), we obtain much lower and plausible values of real wage elasticities 
at different proportions of surplus labour i.e., 0.15, 0.20,and 0.25 (column 1 in table 
B: the starting figure of 0.15 or 15% labour surplus, i.e. f1 has been obtained from 
the GOI - Economi<: Survey,1991. The ratio of Wu/Wr i.e. 1.30 to 1.45 has been 
frequently cited as the necessary wage gap to make migration incentive- compat-
ible, see. e.g. Lewis,W.A. 1954; Ghatak,S and K. lngersent, 1984). 
Table A: Critical values for 1] 
;~ 1.3 1.35 1.40 1.45 
___ ~:!~ ____ .J'= 0.201] _=-.2.9? __ ~_-=.'~:~~1J_~~_:~~ ___ P_=-~~~_=- 9.:17 qJ~' 0.37l! -=.'_~.:~_ 
0.20 qJ = = 4.68 qJ = 0.241] = 5.00 = 0.291] = 5.32 =, 0.371] = 5.66 
0.25 qJ = 0.201] = 3.23 qJ = 0.241] = 3.43 qJ = 0.291] = 3.65 qJ = 0.341] = 3.86 
UI =0.13; = 0.8; SK = 0.3; qJ given by (4.13) 
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Tabh! B: Different Values of TJ 
---------------- -,-- - - - -
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
1.88 
1.50 
1.22 
---
1.63 
1.33 
1.10 
1.43 1.28 
1.19 1.08 
0.99 0.99 
,--------,---.-,--~-- ----.. -
As above cp = 0 
The different parameter values have been obtained from the following sources: 
COl - Statistical Abstract, 1990-1991, CSO, New Delhi, India. 
COl - Economic Survey 1990-91, CSO, New Delhi, India. 
Lucas, R, and C. Papanek (eds.), (l990), The Indian Economy, O~ford University Press; 
India. 
Figure 1 
Rural to Urban Migration with High Real Wage Flexibility 
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Figure 2 
Rural to Urban Migration with L ow Real Wage Flexibility 
Real Product 
Wage = MPL 
o 
4.2 Long-run Analysis 
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In the long run, we allow capital to adjust to the increases migration. The social 
welfare function (4.1) must now be amended to 
(4.14) 
As before we differentiate with respect to M but now allowing the capital stock 
to adjust. Thus 
dS_ = OYI. dLI + oY J. dKl +q [OY A. dLA + oY A .dKAJ-LAC-rK[dK I + dKAJ 
dM OLI dM oK} dM OL A dM aKA dM dM dM 
(4.15) 
This rather long expression simplifies considerably when the long-run first order 
conditions are introduced. From (2.4) and (2.13) the terms in dKrldM and dKA/dM 
are zero. Furthermore in the long run the capital-labour ratio and the urban real 
wage are both fixed at values determined by the exogenously given real interest 
rate. Hence h(UI) = constant. Putting UI=1-Lt/NI and differentiating we get 
h'(U )[2 dL[ + Lil J 0= 0 
I NJ dM N; ( 4.16) 
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provided that h'(U,)neO, It follows that 
dLl ( ") dM-= I - UI LA 
dLA -
in the long run. As before dM =- LA. Substituting into (4.15) gives 
dS -
- = LA[W ICI-U /) - w A(l- Il)-C] 
dM 
In a HT migration equilibrium we have from (2.17) that 
(I-U J)W] + U IWu - C = WA 
Hence 
dS 
dM = wAll .- U IW u 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
There are therefore two distortions which might prevent the HT equilibrium 
being socially efficient in the long run: the existence of an alternative wage w" and 
the labour surplus effect in agriculture. If the latter dominates then more migration 
is welfare-enhancing. This seems to have happened in some countries in Eastern 
Europe like Poland during the process of its industrialisation (Kondratowicz A. et.aL 
1995).Thus we have the following analogue of proposition 3 for the long run 
Proposition 4 
Consider a Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium with rural and urban real 
wages given by WA and WA respectively in terms of units of industrial output. Let UI 
be the urban unemployment rate at this equilibrium. Then a further rural to urban 
migration with an adjustment of capital is welfare-enhancing iff h'(UJ) >0 and 
dS 
-=W AJl -UJWu>O 
dM 
(4.21) 
T he long run equilibrium is illustrated in figure 3. We measure real wages and 
MPL on the vertical axis and employment on the horizontal axis. The bargained 
real wages (BRW) lines slope upwards. OA is the total labour force in East and 
West prior to migration. Let HA = AB be equal to migration. As the BRW in the 
West shifts to the right, employment rises by WW'. In the East, BRW shifts to left 
and employment falls by E'E. The net output gain is given by HJW'W - FGEE' the 
sign of which cannot be determined apriori. The measurement of that area should 
of considerable future research interest. 
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Real Wage = MPL 
o 
Figure 3 
Migration in the Long run 
KEWW' 
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BRW = "BARGAINED REAL WAGE" 
OA = TOTAL LABOUR FORCE IN EAST AND WEST PRIOR TO MIGRATION 
KA == AB = MIGRATION 
BRW (WEST) SHIFTS TO RIGHT: EMPLOYMENT RISES BY WW' 
BRW (EAST) SHIFTS TO LEFT: EMPLOYMENT FALLS BY E'E 
NET OUTPUT GAIN = HJW'W--FGEE' OF INDETERMINATE SIGN 
Conclustions 
On the basis of our analysis of migration and investment in a labour-surplus 
economy, we conclude that a LS economy generally results in a higher level of 
agricultural employment. However, under certain conditions, a LS economy can 
lead to a high degree of capital accumulation depending on the values of the elas-
ticity of substitution among different inputs in a nested CES production function. 
This conclusion is in accord with the special characteristics of the dual economies 
which exhibit considerable accumulation of capital within capitalistic farming sys-
tems despite the presence of surplus labour. We compare the benefits of migra-
tion from higher industrial with costs of migration and a fall in rural output. Our 
results tend to suggest that the net benefits of migration depend on the response 
of urban unemployment rate to migration and the flexibility of real wages with 
respect to unemploment rate. Migration without capital mobility increases welfare 
if the absolute value of the semi-elasticity of the urban real wage with respect to 
unemployment is large. We also show that migration is welfare enhancing in the 
long run if capital is mobile between different sectors. 
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